Stand Like an Elephant, Sting Like a Bee

Our afternoon lecturer came to us from the Center of Policy Research, one of the oldest think tanks in India.  Because he was our only speaker on India’s security issues amidst a sea of econ classes, the two security students were eager to blog about his policy recommendations.  He began with a discussion on India’s concerns regarding Pakistan, particularly radicalization, nuclear terrorism, and its exaggerated threat perception of India.  He suggested that the wars between India and Pakistan are more akin to communal riots than wars, with no conflict lasting longer than fifteen days with fewer total casualties than those that usually result from police action in one year in either country.  Furthermore, he stressed their common culture and kinship which he believes has moderated the violence in the past and will keep the two countries from nuclear escalation.  In his opinion, Pakistan defines itself as “not India”, and this negative identity results in its sometimes aggressive behavior. 

We found many opportunities to critique his views.  First of all, he admits Pakistan sees India as an existential threat, which, to him, justifies its military spending to counter the India threat (and deploying up to 80% of its troops on its southern border with India).  This begs the question: where is the common culture, religion, and familial ties of the military elite. Why would brother India develop nuclear weapons unless it hoped to achieve some sort of primacy to SMASH little brother Pakistan?  Furthermore, the radicalization of Pakistani Muslims and the immigration of Hindus from the country, push the country further from India culturally, and simultaneously creates a Pakistani culture of its own.  In the future we can’t expect the pattern of limited war to continue.  Even if his hypothesis of common culture exists, we would argue that radicalization combined with fading institutional memory of a united India would lessen these cultural and familial ties.  This constructivist argument contradicted his “hyper-realist” stance on China.

The professor argued that the government was not thinking strategically about how to counter its primary (and existential) threat, China.  Just a few of his suggestions included balancing China by nuclearizing Vietnam, testing more (and larger) thermonuclear weapons, and possibly establishing an Indian naval base east of the Straits of Malacca in the South China Sea to prevent the Chinese navy from entering the Indian Ocean.  He also mentioned adding 9 armored divisions to the Tibetan plateau in case of a land war with China and ending India’s no-first-use policy.  It was around this point that he admitted to being called a “hawk” in the Indian foreign policy circles.  How the Dragon would react to these measures was, incidentally, not mentioned. 

We would argue that India is militarily and economically at a complete disadvantage vis-à-vis China, and should focus its energies on maximizing its comparative advantage in order to counter the Panda.  One of the few areas India would be able to contend with China from a position of strength would be in submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean.  The professor explained that this is due to the varying and unique thermal layers in the Indian Ocean that prevent accurate detection by even the most accurate radars in existence.  The Indian Navy has mapped these layers (hydrographic data) which will enable its sonar systems to overcome the detection problems faced by other radars. For this reason, the Indian Navy holds this information very near and dear.  While this was mentioned in response to a question as an afterthought, we found it to be the most interesting part of his lecture, and further believe India should exploit China’s lack of information in this area instead of trying to compete in the South China Sea. 

We were also concerned that, despite India’s advantages in science and technology, they have invested little in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, instead of investing in a nuclear and conventional arms race that they will surely lose.  India should instead look to its strengths, instead of trying to compensate for its weaknesses.  They would have a much better chance of deterring or denying by investing in defensive capabilities and in cyber and electronic warfare technologies.  If nothing else, India needs to bolster its survivable second-strike capability with nuclear subs. 

Our speaker critically discussed the strategic naiveté of Indian foreign policy elites.  But we found a severe discontinuity in his application of IR theory.  If his offensive military suggestions were followed, India would undoubtedly face a heightened security dilemma with China.  He simultaneously applies constructivist theories to Pakistan, and offensive realist theory to China, further evidencing the contradictory nature of his lecture.  India needs to think strategically about how to defend itself, but at the same time, the country faces the mother of all guns v butter dilemmas.  India is in a unique position as a developing democracy with severe security challenges.  If India is going to spend millions of rupees on its defenses instead of feeding its population, it should at least spend in smart, strategic areas that capitalize on its formidable strengths.     

Reporting for duty:

Riley Barnes & Laura Joost, MPIAs 2011